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AVOIDING AVOIDANCE: WHY USE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE
CANON UNDERMINES JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE-A RESPONSE TO
LISA KLOPPENBERG
Michelle R. Slackt
As currently used, the constitutional avoidance canon does not
actually avoid constitutional issues. Instead, because the canon is
triggered by simply raising a serious constitutional issue, its use often
results in expanding constitutional law beyond the limits of any
constitution. Moreover, the canon forces judges to engage in
legislation-either expressly or implicitly-a role not traditionally
belonging to the judicial branch. Although the canon is purportedly a
canon of restraint, the constitutional avoidance canon results in true
judicial activism. Accordingly, use of the constitutional avoidance
canon undermines judicial independence.
INTRODUCTION
A response to the question whether use of constitutional avoidance
promotes judicial independence, as well as a response to Dean Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, necessitates first examining fundamental questions of
judicial independence. Independence from whom? Independence to
do what? Under our constitutional system, the judiciary is not com-
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University School of Law, for his special efforts to make her a part of this fine symposium. In
addition, Professor Slack would like to thank her fellow panel members, Dean Lisa A. Kloppen-
berg, University of Dayton School of Law, and Professor Melvyn R. Durchslag, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, for their fine presentations and insights on the issue of
constitutional avoidance, as well as their feedback on the points made in this paper. Finally,
Professor Slack thanks Professor Patrick Kelley, Southern Illinois University, for his advice on
the symposium presentation and this paper, as well as her research assistant, Cathy Sheets '07,
for all her fine and thorough research on the avoidance doctrine.
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pletely independent. Our system of checks and balances, as well as
the whole concept of separation of powers, embodies the belief that
complete independence is undesirable, even dangerous.'
With these observations in mind, I begin with the premise that the
judicial independence we wish to promote is the judicial power to
perform the traditional judicial role-that of deciding cases and con-
troversies2-independent of substantial intervention through either
direct or indirect action. For example, when Congress tries to tell
judges "how to judge" by setting acceptable reasoning and exacting
standards, the judiciary's ability to perform its traditional role is di-
rectly challenged.3 By contrast, when the President threatens "court
packing" or Congress denies federal judges pay raises to pressure
judges to decide cases differently, the judiciary's ability to perform its
traditional role is indirectly challenged. n Although some may take the
position that these examples are just permissible checks under our
system of separation of powers, the fact remains that such action does
interfere with the traditional judicial role of deciding cases.
In addition to defining the notion of judicial independence, the
concept of "judicial activism" must be addressed. As Dean
Kloppenberg states, "Rhetoric about judicial activism abounds in
modem political campaigns."5 Judicial activism has largely been used
as a synonym for judges whose decisions favor liberal views, protect
civil liberties, and expand the protections of the Bill of Rights.6 Yet,
As Dean Kloppenberg acknowledges in her paper, "Our divided system of democratic
governance affords an opportunity for dialogue .... [And] it is critical for this to be an ongoing,
long-term dialogue in which judges, legislators, and other constitutional actors participate ac-
tively in shaping our understanding of the Constitution's protections and limitations." Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial Independence? 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2006).
2 Professor Durchslag quotes Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Inevitability
(and Desirability?) of Avoidance: A Response to Dean Kloppenberg, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1043, 1043 (2006) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). I agree
with Professor Durchslag that what this means is, itself, a hotly debated point, but I start with a
basic premise that deciding cases and controversies is the traditional judicial role. Although the
traditional role involves interpreting statutes and precedent, creating common law, and enforc-
ing judgments, the judiciary's primary purpose is to decide-not legislate or execute.
3 Mark Tushnet, The "Constitution Restoration Act" and Judicial Independence: Some
Observations, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1071, 1076-78 (2006) (examining how the proposed
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005 will control perceived abuses of judicial authority).
4 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial
Independence, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 965-67 (2006) (considering whether the compen-
sation clause, which prevents Congress from lowering the salaries of federal judges during their
tenure, has any effect on Congress's taxing power).
5 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1031.
6 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of
Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 915 (2006) (arguing that judicial accountabil-
ity should turn on the judge's state of mind rather than mere political concerns).
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decisions such as Bush v. Gore7 and the recent federalism cases
highlight the fact that activism can come from both sides of the
political spectrum.8 Thus, rather than using activism as a synonym for
a particular political ideology, this response will use activism to mean
judicial conduct that steps outside the traditional role of judges and
embarks upon a role traditionally left to the legislature or executive.
With all this concern about judicial activism, particularly the
courts' expansion of constitutional civil liberties, it might seem as if
constitutional avoidance would further judicial independence. After
all, as reflected in Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,9 outlining the principles of
constitutional avoidance, avoiding constitutional issues demonstrates
judicial restraint. Moreover, in Alexander Bickel's famous piece, The
Passive Virtues, avoidance is elevated to a virtue-in which it is
named as passive, not active, judicial decision-making. 10 Yet, as
discussed further in this response, unlike other types of avoidance, the
constitutional avoidance canon actually undermines several of the
Ashwander principles, leading to something more akin to passive-
aggressive activism 1 and ultimately undermines judicial independence.
CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE-DEAN KLOPPENBERG'S POSITION
In her book 2 and her paper, 3 Dean Lisa A. Kloppenberg takes the
position that through use of numerous avoidance techniques, courts
sidestep important constitutional issues and, as a result, fail to protect
constitutional rights and undermine the development of the law.
14
Moreover, according to Kloppenberg, because these avoidance
techniques are selectively used in mainly the socially and politically
7 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
8 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1031.
9 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
10 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
11 But see Philip P. Frickey, Gettingfrom Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93
CAL. L. REV. 397, 416 (2005) (suggesting that at least in some instances the canon is "a passive
virtue rather than a passive-aggressive vice").
12 LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS
HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (2001).
13 Kloppenberg, supra note 1.
R' See also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV.
1003 (1994) (arguing that federal courts should dismiss the last resort rule except in cases in
which they are asked to void a legislative or executive action); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free
Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court should
directly address constitutional issues in free speech cases rather than allow political considera-
tions to influence its application of the avoidance canon).
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sensitive cases, those most in need of the court's protection of their
constitutional rights are left unprotected. 15 Ultimately, Kloppenberg
proposes that avoidance, itself, should be avoided.
IN RESPONSE TO DEAN KLOPPENBERG ON THE USE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE
A. Basic Considerations
In response, I agree with Dean Kloppenberg on a number of pre-
liminary points, as well as on her ultimate conclusion. In addition, as
Kloppenberg does in her article, I too wish to focus my response on
the avoidance canon and presumptions. Yet, because I will approach
the canon from a different angle, with different concerns and pre-
sumptions in mind, I disagree that the use of the canon fails to protect
alleged constitutional rights when it is invoked. Rather, precisely be-
cause the avoidance canon goes beyond the Constitution and protects
more than constitutional rights, placing the courts in legislative roles,
I believe its use ultimately undermines judicial independence and
should be avoided.
I begin my agreement where Dean Kloppenberg begins her article.
I agree with the premise that the duty and ability to uphold the Consti-
tution belong to more than just the judiciary. As Kloppenberg states,
"Courts are not alone in wielding the responsibility and power of con-
stitutional interpretation. Congress and state legislatures, federal and
state executive officers, and many others act to interpret the U.S.
Constitution in their daily work."' 6 Indeed, the legislative and execu-
tive branches have the duty to uphold the Constitution, and I believe it
is a duty taken quite seriously. In fact, as explained later, it is pre-
cisely because this duty also belongs to Congress, as well as the judi-
ciary, that I find the avoidance canon so offensive and problematic.
Next, I agree with Dean Kloppenberg's premise that the avoidance
doctrine is invoked primarily in socially and politically sensitive
cases. Some of the examples given by Kloppenberg include desegre-
gation, discrimination, and dissent speech (the Cold War cases). 17
From my own experience in the Department of Justice's Civil Divi-
sion, Office of Immigration Litigation, I have seen the courts invoke
avoidance techniques in socially sensitive immigration cases, avoid-
ing the constitutional implications of actions such as the indefinite
15 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1036.
16 Id. at 1031.
17 Id. at 1036.
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detention of illegal aliens' 8 and habeas corpus review over deporta-
tion orders for criminal aliens.' 9 Similarly, in an era of increased
threats to national security, the courts are invoking avoidance tech-
niques in the related area of counterterrorism and detention of sus-
pected terrorists.20 In many respects, the courts' use of avoidance
techniques in the area of counterterrorism is comparable to its prior
Cold War era use in the dissent speech cases.2'
I also agree with Dean Kloppenberg on the motives of judges in
using avoidance techniques in socially sensitive cases.22 Judges are
threatened with both professional and personal harm when they make
socially or politically unpopular decisions. Such threats come from
within government and from the public.23 Having clerked for the
Honorable Frank J. Battisti, who ordered the desegregation of the
Cleveland Public Schools, I became aware of the pressures on judges
to avoid such issues.
Furthermore, like Dean Kloppenberg, I too wish to focus on the
avoidance canon. But, it is at this point that my response parts ways
with Kloppenberg, at least until the ultimate conclusion of avoiding
avoidance. 24 This is because the avoidance canon, unlike other
avoidance techniques, actually serves to overprotect those alleging
constitutional infringement without actually recognizing a
constitutional right-the litigants that Kloppenberg claims avoidance
leaves unprotected.
18 See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (finding that petitions for habeas cor-
pus should have been granted on statutory grounds); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)
(finding an implicit "reasonable time" limitation on detentions of aliens under the statute in
question).
19 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that the alien could seek relief
under the applicable statute); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545
(1990) (discussing use of avoidance in immigration cases).
20 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 574-75 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the plurality is merely avoiding the constitutional issue posed by detaining citizen
enemy combatants without bringing criminal charges).
21 See Frickey, supra note 11, at 463-64 (comparing the tension and motives for using
avoidance in the Cold War speech cases with those of the current war on terrorism).
22 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1035 (stating that "due to the concerns about deference,
foreclosure and threats to judicial independence, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed
avoidance techniques selectively over the last three decades .... Sometimes it is overt-the
justices write about political pressure on the courts; more often, the political controversy goes
unstated").
23 Id. at 1031 ("Judicial independence is threatened from some quarters, as particular
judges are targeted for unpopular decisions with death threats, through email or media cam-
paigns, or by calls for recall or impeachment proceedings.").
24 Kloppenberg's article proposes a presumption against avoidance, stating that "courts
should reverse [the Rehnquist Court's] presumption" favoring avoidance. Id. at 1040; see also
KLOPPENBERG, supra note 12, at 271-77 (concluding the book with a chapter entitled "Looking
Toward the Future: A Presumption Against Avoidance").
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Ordinarily, when a court declines to reach the merits of a constitu-
tional claim based upon a lack of standing, the complaining litigant
receives no protection from the allegedly unconstitutional action
without the court ever deciding the constitutional issue.25 Likewise, in
a case in which a court abstains from deciding the merits of a consti-
tutional claim, the complaining litigant usually receives no protection
from allegedly unconstitutional action without ever deciding the con-
stitutional issue.26
Similarly, the avoidance canon results in no clear decision on the
constitutionality of a particular problematic interpretation. As Klop-
penberg explains, "The canon is a tool used by courts to interpret
statutes narrowly when they raise 'serious constitutional ques-
tions.', 2 7 Instead of invalidating legislation, the court "avoids" the
issue by giving the statute a different meaning than the possibly of-
fensive one.
Yet, unlike other avoidance techniques, the avoidance canon usu-
ally does result in protection for the litigant complaining of possible
unconstitutional conduct. Thus, contrary to Dean Kloppenberg's
premise, the selective enforcement of avoidance in socially sensitive
cases, at least when it comes to the avoidance canon, serves to protect
those less politically powerful in society-those most in need of court
protection.28 Unfortunately, it is this distinction between the avoid-
ance canon and other avoidance techniques that increases the tension
between the government branches when the canon is used, thereby
undermining judicial independence.
As I will explain herein, the use of the avoidance canon under-
mines judicial independence because it protects without deciding,
presumes unconstitutionality when constitutionality should be pre-
sumed, rewrites legislation while claiming to be restrained, and in the
end, actually fails to avoid the constitutional issue.
25 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 12, at 39-66 (discussing standing in environmental
cases); id. at 67-55 (discussing standing in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)
(refusing to enjoin the use of choke holds by the City of Los Angeles Police Department based
upon standing)); see also Durchslag, supra note 2, at 1052 (discussing Lyons).
26 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 12, at 5-9 (discussing abstention doctrine).
27 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1037.
28 Although use of the canon ordinarily does protect the less politically powerful, excep-
tions do exist. In Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1229-32 (11 th Cir. 2005) (en
banc), the Eleventh Circuit applied the avoidance canon to avoid the constitutional issue that
would be raised if the Voting Rights Act (VRA) applied to a felony disenfranchisement statute.
As a result, the disenfranchised felon's action, under the Voting Rights Act, was dismissed
because the court read the VRA to not apply to felony disenfranchisement statutes.
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B. The Avoidance Canon: Presuming Unconstitutionality
The avoidance canon, unlike other avoidance techniques,
functionally results in a presumption of unconstitutionality. Because
the canon is triggered by a mere possibility of a serious constitutional
question, courts applying the canon never directly decide the
constitutionality of the questionable reading of a statute. As a result,
the canon creates a protective zone around possibly unconstitutional
interpretations because the court will not get close enough to the
Constitution to tell us how close is too close, thereby expanding the
reach of constitutional prohibitions. Dean Kloppenberg recognizes
this peculiar result, calling this protective zone "shadow or phantom
constitutional norms. 29 Judge Posner, too, recognized the canon's
effect of creating a "judge-made penumbra" around certain
constitutional issues, permitting judicial expansion of the
Constitution. 30 Regardless of terminology, the result is the same-an
additional zone around the Constitution the courts will protect without
ever recognizing an actual constitutional violation.
Further expanding this protected zone, the avoidance doctrine can
be applied to avoid the "lowest common denominator"--cases in
which no serious constitutional issue is presented by the current liti-
gant's case, but by other possible litigants not currently before the
court. The Supreme Court applied this principle recently in Clark v.
Martinez.3' In Clark, the Court faced the issue whether inadmissible
aliens could be indefinitely detained when their country of origin re-
fused to accept their return. In an earlier case, Zadvydas v. Davis,
32
the Court faced a similar issue when it decided that previously admit-
ted aliens, who had subsequently violated the law and were under
valid deportation orders, could not be detained beyond a certain pe-
riod of time, even when their countries of origin refused to accept
their return. In Zadvydas, the Court used the avoidance canon to avoid
the "serious constitutional issue" raised by reading the detention stat-
ute to permit long term detention of previously admitted aliens.33 The
Court specifically recognized that "[a]liens who have not yet gained
29 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1037; see also Motomura, supra note 19, at 549 (explain-
ing "phantom constitutional norms").
30 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CI. L. REv. 800, 816 (1983) (discussing the "penumbra" resulting from avoidance doc-
trine); see also Sanford G. Hooper, Note, Judicial Minimalism and the National Dialogue on
Immigration: The Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine in Zadvydas v. Davis, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 975, 991 (2002) (discussing Judge Posner's recognition of the "penumbra effect").
31 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005) (applying "lowest common denominator" principle to
avoid constitutional issues that might be raised by those not currently before the Court).
32 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
33 Id. at 682; see also Clark, 543 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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initial admission to this country would present a very different ques-
tion" from those admitted to the United States, thereby explicitly re-
serving the issue of detaining inadmissible aliens.34
Yet, in Clark, the Court applied the same interpretation of the de-
tention statute to inadmissible aliens as it had applied to previously
admitted aliens in Zadvydas, relying upon the principle of "the lowest
common denominator." As Justice Scalia's majority opinion explains,
"If one [of two plausible constructions of a statute] would raise a mul-
titude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail-whether
or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant
before the Court. 35 In sharp contrast to the view of some commenta-
tors, 36 the Court made clear that "[t]he canon is not a method of adju-
dicating constitutional questions by other means,' 37 but rather "the
role played by the canon of constitutional avoidance is statutory in-
,,38terpretation. As a result, this protected zone created by the avoid-
ance canon grows further, by covering matters that do not even raise
serious constitutional issues.
Theoretically, the question of whether the allegedly problematic
reading is constitutional or not is left for another day. In fact, this is
one of the goals behind avoidance-affording an opportunity for dia-
logue between the courts and Congress. 39 Unfortunately, in most in-
stances, this is pure theory, not reality. The reason for this incongruity
between theory and reality here is basically two-fold. The first reason
for this incongruity is the legislative realities presented by legislating
in an area the courts have marked as raising "serious constitutional
issues." The second reason for the incongruity is found in courts'
responses to legislative action once the avoidance doctrine has been
used to avoid a particular meaning to a statute.
As a matter of practical and political reality, the legislature often
will not respond to a court's avoidance of any particular intended
interpretation of a statute.40 As Kloppenberg recognizes, it often ap-
pears difficult for Congress to respond to the Supreme Court's phan-
tom norms, either resulting from a lack of "time or political will to
34 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
35 Clark, 543 U.S. at 380-81.
3 Frickey, supra note 11, at 402 (purporting "to demonstrate that the avoidance canon is
not so much a maxim of statutory interpretation as it is a tool of constitutional law").
37 Clark, 543 U.S. at 381.
38 Id.
39 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1038.
40 See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 11, at 400-01 (reviewing critiques of the avoidance canon
and discussing the practical difficulties involved "for Congress to dislodge Uudicially rewritten
statutes] from the statute books").
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reconsider the issue. 'A1 In addition to a lack of political will, the Court
creates an additional political hurdle to legislation vaguely marked in
a constitutional "danger zone." Yet, in instances in which the legisla-
ture refocuses on the piece of legislation, musters up the political will,
and overcomes the heightened political controversy to revise a statute
(making it clear that the avoided reading is the intended reading), the
courts respond in a hostile manner by "chid[ing] other governmental
actors for not avoiding a constitutional 'danger zone."' 42 Instead of a
meaningful dialogue, therefore, Congress is left questioning why the
Court did not originally say the clearest reading was unconstitutional.
This creates frustration, resulting in more tension between the
branches and more threats to judicial independence. In any event,
regardless of the reasons, these phantom norms within this so-called
danger zone remain protected from governmental action, creating
what I will call a presumption of unconstitutionality.
C. The Avoidance Canon's Presumption of Unconstitutionality Runs
Head-On into the Presumption of Constitutionality
By creating a presumption of unconstitutionality for any interpre-
tation within the protected penumbra around the Constitution, the
avoidance canon runs right into another canon of statutory interpreta-
tion-the presumption of constitutionality. Generally, when an issue
of constitutionality arises, courts presume a statute's constitutionality.
In fact, in my experience working with the Department of Justice's
Judicial Appointments Committee,43 the canon presuming constitu-
tionality was often the first response judicial nominees gave to ques-
tions on statutory interpretation posed by senators during hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Committee.44
The basic principle behind the presumption of constitutionality is
the recognition that courts are not the only governmental actors with
the duty and ability to uphold the Constitution,45 a premise raised in
the introduction to this response and the beginning of Dean Kloppen-
41 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1038; see also Clark, 543 U.S. at 402 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (stating "the realities of the legislative process often preclude readopting the original
meaning of a statute that we have upset").
42 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1038.
43 While serving as an attorney for the Department of Justice, I served as a volunteer on
the Judicial Appointments Committee in the Office of Policy Development. The Committee
worked to vet nominees, as well as prepare nominees for hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
4 Notably, I do not recall any instance in which a nominee referred to the constitutional
avoidance canon when posed with questions on statutory interpretation or constitutional law.
45 See Frickey, supra note 11, at 411 (recognizing the "strong presumption of constitu-
tionality to Acts of Congress" and discussing the rationale behind this rule).
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46berg's article. Yet, unlike the avoidance canon, the presumption of
constitutionality canon is truly deferential-an actual canon of judi-
cial restraint-that furthers judicial independence by respecting the
other branches' roles and duty to uphold the Constitution.
For obvious reasons, the presumption of constitutionality does not
protect legislation from all constitutional attacks. If a particular inter-
pretation is clearly unconstitutional, the presumption is overcome.
Likewise, if a particular reading raises no serious constitutional prob-
lem, the presumption is unnecessary in interpreting the statute in
question. Yet, like other legal presumptions, absent clear evidence to
the contrary and in situations that could go either way, the presump-
tion should carry the day. In other words, the presumption should
protect interpretations that come close to the constitutional limits, but
do not exceed them clearly. Essentially, when there is constitutional
doubt, Congress should get the benefit of the doubt. Unfortunately,
the presumption of constitutionality is most appropriately invoked for
the same zone of cases-those in the zone around the Constitution-
covered by the avoidance canon and its corresponding presumption of
unconstitutionality. As a result, the avoidance canon's presumption of
unconstitutionality, ironically, runs head-on into the presumption of
constitutionality.
D. The Presumption of Constitutionality Should Win the War over the
Danger Zone
In this war over the constitutional danger zone in which constitu-
tional issues are merely raised by a particular interpretation, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality should defeat the avoidance canon.
Congress should get the benefit of the constitutional doubt, not the
other way around. If the real goal is judicial restraint, mutual respect
of coequal branches, and fostering dialogue, the presumption of con-
stitutionality wins out over the avoidance canon. Applying the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when the constitutionality of a particular
reading is unclear gives the presumption true meaning. Moreover, it
will go much further in promoting harmony between the legislature
and the judiciary than would the avoidance canon, thereby promoting
judicial independence.
As previously explained, the avoidance canon leads to the peculiar
result of creating a zone of phantom constitutional norms around the
Constitution, expanding its reach.47 Additionally, the application of
46 Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1031.
47 See id. at 1037 (discussing phantom constitutional norms); Posner, supra note 30 (dis-
cussing judge-made penumbra).
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the lowest common denominator principle to the avoidance canon
further expands this quasi-constitutional reach. This is hardly the pas-
sive judicial action canon it purports to be. By contrast, the presump-
tion of constitutionality provides deference to Congress and is more
likely to foster true dialogue between the branches than the avoidance
canon.
One reason the avoidance canon provokes controversy, despite its
purported goal of restraint, is that it places the judiciary in a legisla-
tive, not judicial, role.48 In many cases, the Court applies the canon to
essentially rewrite statutes that were clear on their face.49 As Justice
Kennedy observed in Zadvydas, use of the canon can lead to the
Court's "own grave constitutional error" by creating "a statutory
amendment of its own" that is an "obvious disregard of congressional
intent.' '50 By applying the presumption of constitutionality in in-
stances in which there is doubt, the judiciary can remain true to its
traditional role.
Moreover, giving the legislature the benefit of the constitutional
doubt by presuming constitutionality when doubt exists furthers the
presumption's true meaning. Professor Frickey dismisses the applica-
tion of the presumption unless "it appears that the precise point in
issue here has been considered by Congress and has been explicitly
and deliberately resolved. 51 In my opinion, however, a presumption
that requires clear evidence before it is invoked is no presumption at
all. Presumptions are meant to apply unless there is evidence to the
contrary. Thus, giving the presumption of constitutionality true mean-
ing would presume that Congress recognized the constitutional obli-
gations, rather than assume congressional ignorance.
48 See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 11, at 399 n.6 (citing cases addressing the avoidance doc-
trine's tendency to place the judiciary in a legislative role); id. at 400-01 (acknowledging that
the canon is "really legislative in character" and results in a "judicially rewritten statute");
Hooper, supra note 30, at 988 (stating that "[a] survey of scholarly criticism of the constitutional
avoidance doctrine reveals" that many agree that "the avoidance canon is conducive to judicial
usurpation of powers traditionally reserved for other branches of government"); Harold J. Krent,
Avoidance and Its Costs: Application of the Clear Statement Rule to Supreme Court Review of
NLRB Cases, 15 CoNN. L. REV. 209, 245 (1983) (concluding that avoidance usurps the legisla-
tive role, leading to 'judicial policymaking").
49 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 327-36
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 481-82 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 212-13 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring in result).
5o Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705.
51 Frickey, supra note 11, at 411.
2006] 1067
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
E. Putting the Avoidance Canon in Its Proper Place-Avoiding the
Avoidance Canon
After reaching the conclusion that when in constitutional doubt,
the presumption of constitutionality should govern, a logical question
remains-What role, if any, remains for the avoidance canon?
At this point in my response, I return to Dean Kloppenberg's con-
clusion that avoidance itself should be avoided. In my opinion, when
it comes to the avoidance canon, I agree with Dean Kloppenberg.
Rather than employing the avoidance canon when a mere constitu-
tional doubt exists and creating a penumbra around the Constitution,
the avoidance canon should be applied as a last resort. The avoidance
canon should be applied only when the Court has exhausted other
available tools of statutory construction and the reading goes beyond
a vague, undefined danger zone into the clearly marked red zone of
unconstitutional interpretations. If the Court avoided the avoidance
canon and made it its own doctrine of last resort, the Ashwander prin-
ciples of judicial restraint would be a reality-not mere theory.
By making the canon itself a last resort, the Ashwander concern
over the "delicate and final nature of judicial review" is satisfied. As a
doctrine of last resort, the canon still protects statutes from invalida-
tion, but only as a final measure. When there is doubt, the presump-
tion of constitutionality would apply to also protect the legislation
from invalidation. Both tools of construction would have their place
rather than clashing with one another.
Moreover, the canon should only be used in a court of last resort-
the United States Supreme Court on issues of federal constitutional
law and the state's highest court for issues of state constitutional law.
Judicial review is not final until the issue is before a court of last re-
sort. Thus, the "delicate and final nature of judicial review" is not
truly at play until the issue is before a court of last resort.
Avoiding the avoidance canon in this manner also increases the
judicial dialogue on constitutional issues. When lower courts invoke
the canon to avoid a constitutional issue, it thwarts lower court ex-
amination of the constitutional issue and prevents the Supreme Court
from benefiting from the lower courts' opinions on the merits of a
constitutional claim, thereby undermining the development of the law
prior to the highest court weighing in on the issue. Building a judicial
dialogue among the judiciary will also alert the legislature of potential
problems with its legislation by giving the legislature an opportunity
to weigh in on the matter and clarify its intent. Thus, before an issue
gets to the court of last resort, the legislature will more likely be
aware of the difficulties with a given interpretation and will be capa-
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ble of responding prior to the Court considering the issue. As a result,
leaving use of the avoidance canon to courts of last resort would in-
crease the dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature.
CONCLUSION
In the interests of preserving judicial independence, the judiciary
should be mindful of its traditional role and careful not to step on
legislative toes. Congress should get the benefit of the constitutional
doubt and avoidance, itself, should be avoided. Although my reasons
may differ, I agree with Dean Kloppenberg. In fact, in my opinion, by
making this doctrine its own doctrine of last resort, the concern over
the "delicate and final nature of judicial review" remains protected,
and the dialogue between the branches can be heard.

